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Public Opinion Research In Emerging 







This paper outlines the larger methodological, logistical and political 
challenges confronting survey researchers in emerging democracies in 
developing country contexts, particularly in Africa. Overcoming these 
challenges often means that comparative social scientific surveys of public 
opinion are designed, executed, and received in very different ways than in the 
West. But rather than simply seeing these differences as blemishes that need to 
be gradually ameliorated, we may have much more to learn from the 
globalization of public opinion research than the simple accumulation of more 





As late as the 1878 Berlin Conference, Western geographers knew more about 
the topography of the moon than the interior of Africa (Pakenham, 1991). Yet as 
late as the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, much the same thing could be said about 
social scientists’ knowledge of ordinary Africans. As scholars of political 
behaviour scrutinized virtually every aspect of the opinions and behaviours of 
American and European voters, we knew virtually nothing about the values, 
preferences or knowledge of the mass of humanity living in Africa—and indeed 
throughout the developing post colonial world—even though much of this world 
stood on the precipice of breaking its authoritarian chains and embarking on a 
wide range of democratic experiments. 
 
One would not have necessarily predicted such a continuing dearth of 
knowledge just thirty years earlier. In the middle of the 1960s, there were 
reasons to hope that this deficit would be cut rapidly through pioneering surveys 
in Latin America, Asia and Africa conducted by scholars like Gabriel Almond, 




Lerner and Joel Barkan. But a second generation of empirical scholars never 
emerged to build on this formative work as evolving trends in both politics and 
social science fashion set back the exploration, mapping and explanation of 
public opinion in the developing world for another three decades (Almond, 
1990). 
 
Fortunately, the widespread collapse of authoritarian and totalitarian political 
systems that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall eclipsed both those social 
systems and social science paradigms that had prevented the widespread 
application of survey research, and the comparative cross-national exploration of 
public opinion in the developing world finally took off. Dozens of transitions 
away from authoritarian rule toward open, competitive, multi-party politics led 
scholars either to dust off unfashionable theories of political legitimacy and 
civic culture, or develop new applications of theories from other fields—like 
social capital—to the study of democratization. At the same time, rapidly 
changing priorities of scientific funders, international agencies and bilateral aid 
agencies with newfound missions in democratic strengthening led to a unique 
fusion of analytical interest, normative commitment, and political need that 
supported an unprecedented proliferation of comparative survey research. 
 
This proliferation represents more than the simple spread of Western social 
science paradigms and technologies to new areas and the accumulation of new 
knowledge about heretofore understudied subjects. Rather, the extension of 
survey research to the developing, democratizing world portends important 
shifts in the way we study public opinion, democracy, and comparative politics. 
While the actual tool of the survey appears the same in form, social conditions 
often mean that its application differs from the Western standard in important 
ways and may produce some important alternatives to the normal Western 
textbook methods. Moreover, the political and social context of transition means 
that the content of questionnaires as well as the purpose of systematic public 
opinion research also differs quite substantially from the standard academic 
survey research paradigm in Western democracies, producing as many political 





In order to understand how the new comparative survey research in emerging 
democracies differs from its older sister in the West, one must begin from the 




entails a range of important consequences. First, a large proportion of these 
societies were created by colonial map-makers who often divided groups of 
people with common ethnic backgrounds (in terms of language, religion, tribe, 
clan), forced dissimilar groups together within the same borders, or left behind 
significant proportions of settlers. Thus, compared to the Western societies in 
which public opinion research originally developed, the relative social 
heterogeneity of these societies creates a range of challenges to drawing 
representative samples. Second, without resorting to either imperialist or 
underdevelopment theories of colonialism, it is clear that these societies are 
characterized by relatively high levels of poverty and inequality, and that this is 
connected in some way to the legacies of their colonial experience. Economic 
inequality not only creates yet another social cleavage that must be factored into 
sampling designs and data analysis, but low levels of infrastructural 
development and high levels of poverty mean that these societies often have 
limited bases of social data that can be used as a sampling frame. 
 
Third, the ideologies of anti-colonial movements and ensuing post independent 
governments of both the left and the right have left a range of bitter political 
legacies that to this day question the role of, and shrink the space for 
independent and open intellectual inquiry, whether conducted by universities or 
civil society organizations. Fourth, these same ideologies have bequeathed a 
great deal of skepticism and suspicion toward the positivist systematic empirical 
methodology of behavioral social science. Yogendra Yadav (2005, p. 1), co-




The worst thing you could say about any political scientist was that he or 
she ‘did survey research.’ The label ‘survey research’ stood for what was 
considered to be most inappropriate in the third world imitations of the 
American science of politics: it was methodologically naïve, politically 
conservative and culturally inauthentic. 
 
The combination of political hostility to independent inquiry and anti-positivist 
hostility to empirical research has had important impacts on both the demand 
and supply of survey research in the developing world. On the supply side, it has 
severely reduced the stock of scholars trained in systematic empirical research 
and quantitative methods in general, let alone survey research. On the demand 
side, it has produced a relatively innumerate and skeptical political class of 





A final important factor is the considerable interest that international 
organizations and Western governments now take in comparative multi-country 
studies and the substantial funds they invest in them. While certainly welcome, 
one clear consequence is that comparative cross-national survey research can not 
now, if it ever could, be seen as a purely social scientific enterprise. The rest of 
this chapter will trace the implications of these factors for the purpose, design 








These factors entail a wide range of potential methodological dilemmas for 
comparative public opinion researchers ranging from relatively simpler issues 
like collaboration with local partners to more complex issues such as fieldwork, 
sampling and questionnaire design. Many of these dilemmas involve trade-offs 
between strict adherence to standard survey methodologies and incurring greatly 





Given the sheer scope of conducting fieldwork in and across these societies, 
comparative surveys are almost always collaborative, involving varying forms 
of partnerships between international (usually European or North American 
based) and national researchers with survey expertise in the countries of interest. 
Collaborative partnerships are also a realistic way to establish the local 
legitimacy of the project. Local legitimacy is important where the formal 
approval of cabinet ministers or security officials, or the informal consent of 
local leaders is necessary to conduct fieldwork, but also where the intended 
                                           
1 While I refer to the democratizing world in general, my remarks apply more directly to 
survey research in Africa and Asia and to a lesser extent Latin America. I illustrate this 
argument primarily with examples from Africa, the region most widely thought to be 
inhospitable to systematic survey research, though I tap examples from Asia and Latin 




political impact of the project is premised on national leaders’ acceptance of the 
survey results. 
 
But legitimacy usually requires local researchers do more than simply contribute 
their knowledge to sampling, fieldwork and questionnaire design. They must 
also be involved in the analysis and dissemination of survey data, avoiding the 
simple replication of colonial patterns whereby local researchers ‘mine’ raw data 
but ‘export’ it to European and North American researchers who ‘refine’ it and 
receive the scholarly credit and recognition. Yet in this pursuit, opinion 
researchers soon confront the paucity of local social science quantitative 
research capacity. On one hand, those local survey researchers with the requisite 
skills to draw samples and conduct systematic fieldwork usually draw their 
experience from demographic and econometric household surveys but are often 
unfamiliar with the substantive political science or sociological literatures that 
underpin the questionnaire. On the other hand, local sociologists and political 
scientists who might be conversant with key concepts and literatures often have 
little or no training in research design, survey research, or data analysis. Thus, 
comparative researchers interested in more than simple data mining should be 
prepared to devote significant time to building basic capacity in survey research 
and data analysis. As Seligson (2005, p. 55) has observed, ‘without local 





Social heterogeneity and low levels of development pose a range of challenges 
to contacting and interviewing representative samples of respondents. Because 
all respondents should be able to hear the survey in the language of their choice, 
researchers must select fieldworkers, or firms whose fieldworkers are fluent in 
all languages likely to be needed to interview any particular sample as well as 
conversant with local norms of interaction and dress. Questionnaires must also 
be translated into all relevant languages to avoid forcing interviewers to produce 
on the spot translations. This in turn necessitates identifying and hiring the 
services of trained linguists for each of as many as a dozen different languages 
in places like Nigeria, Kenya or South Africa. This is just the first of many 
factors that drive up survey costs in developing societies. 
 
Outside of a handful of countries, low and/or extremely uneven rates of 




interviews are simply not an option.2 Yet the combination of heterogeneous, 
relatively rural and dispersed populations with poor road networks means that 
contacting and conducting personal interviews with a random, nationally 
representative sample of 1,200 or 2,400 respondents can be an extremely 
demanding and expensive proposition (though Latin America, which is 
relatively urbanized, seems to be an exception: see Seligson, 2005, p. 51). 
 
In some places, fieldwork teams have absolutely no roads to use to reach 
selected sampling areas. In mountainous Lesotho, for example, Afrobarometer 
researchers ride horseback to conduct interviews in selected villages. In many 
cases, fieldwork teams have to traverse tortuous dirt or gravel roads which 
require renting expensive four wheel drive vehicles. In Mozambique, most good 
roads run from mining towns to the closest coastal port, and few if any connect 
these towns with each other, posing significant challenges to devising cost 
effective ways to move fieldwork teams around the country. 
 
Low levels of infrastructural development pose other significant burdens. There 
may be no appropriate sources of lodging or even food near selected interview 
areas. And vague maps and poor signposting make it difficult for interview 
teams to determine when they have entered (or exited) a selected sampling area 
and may necessitate the use of GPS instruments. In sum, a week of interviews in 
rural areas often turns into an exotic and challenging camping expedition. 
 
At the same time, one advantage of doing opinion research in new democracies 
is that respondents are far more willing to allow themselves to be interviewed 
and to give interviewers a significant amount of their time. Virtually all 
researchers I have spoken to working in the developing world agree that it is 
possible to conduct surveys lasting an average of at least 45 minutes. Some 
questionnaires, such as the World Values Survey, take far more time, though the 
impact on response quality is a real question. In general, respondents are 
engaged and genuinely interested, which is fortunate since prevailing customs or 
overcoming initial suspicions may require interviewers to engage in extended 
cordialities with the head of household or respondent, adding additional time 
over and above the actual interview. Indeed, fieldworkers often report 
difficulties ending interviews because respondents want to carry on their 
discussion. 
                                           
2 On the other hand, this could be an advantage given the rising levels of non-response in 
developed countries created by refusals, answering machines and call-blocking, let alone the 




But while most respondents are quite willing to be interviewed, the lack of 
familiarity with the entire idea of surveys as well as general innumeracy present 
a range of problems for simply applying the standard methods contained in 
Western textbooks. First of all, typical methods of random selection within a 
household, whether it be pre-selection from a register of citizens or voters, or 
other random devices like the Kish or Politz Grids or even a birthday rule, are 
not transparent and may confuse respondents and create unnecessary suspicion. 
This is especially true in patriarchal societies where male heads of households 
may be open to the idea, but object to being told that the interview has to be 
done with their wife or daughter. Such situations, however, present wonderful 
laboratories where we can use local knowledge to advance survey methodology. 
For example, dealing playing cards to either all eligible males, or all eligible 
females in the household, and then allowing the patriarch to pull the card of the 
sampled person, simultaneously respects local traditions yet retains randomness 





Drawing samples of respondents that are representative of the typical developing 
society presents comparative survey researchers with a wide range of obstacles 
and trade-offs. To begin with, relatively high levels of social heterogeneity 
(featuring politically important cleavages along linguistic, religious, racial or 
class lines) means that researchers need to consider drawing relatively large 
samples (compared to the typical n = 1,200 survey sample in the West) to ensure 
that they represent socially and politically significant sub national groups or 
regions, and are thus able to test adequately for statistically significant 
differences across these cleavages. But besides the costs of the additional 
interviews, mapping these cleavages requires high quality demographic data, 
something which developing societies with weak census bureaus may not be 
able to provide. In a small number of countries, especially those marred by 
recent histories of civil war, census data is simply too old to be of any use. In 
other countries, the census may have once been reliable, but the information 
used to update it is often suspect. 
 
Matters are even more difficult when it comes to the nature of the sampling 
frame. A large number of countries have no reliable lists of citizens, households 
or even registered voters. Census department maps often feature only the 
boundaries of enumerator areas and contain no information about the location or 




levels of mobility mean that they quickly go out of date and research teams find 
that they bear little resemblance to the reality they confront in the field, 
especially in informal housing areas. 
 
Thus, census enumerator areas are typically the smallest bit of reliable 
information that survey researchers have to create a sampling frame. If 
researchers want to calculate selection probabilities at second or third stages of 
household and respondent selection, they must map and enumerate the selected 
area themselves, which significantly increases the amount of time interview 
teams need to be present in selected areas and drastically increases fieldwork 
costs. The lack of good data at this level also raises the issue of substitution. 
Standard survey texts warn against substitution (generally because of the belief 
that it grants too much discretion to interviewers and precludes the possibility of 
calculating contact, refusal and response rates). Instead, they recommend that 
researchers draw larger than required samples that anticipate refusals, or draw 
additional, smaller sample ‘packages’ that are only opened and contacted in their 
entirety if the realized sample falls short. 
 
However, accurately anticipating refusal rates presumes that survey researchers 
have a firm idea of what that rate is likely to be across their country and within 
specific regions based on the track record of previous surveys. But such a 
reliable track record does not exist where survey research is in its infancy. And 
drawing packages of over-samples to be interviewed after the original sample 
requires interviewers to move back into the countryside, greatly increasing 
survey costs. 
 
These costs also have to be set against other considerations. For example, 
clustering interviews within primary sampling units, and primary sampling units 
within secondary sampling units, might reduce travel costs significantly. But 
where a project’s goal is not only to produce scientific data but also to have 
local policy impact, an overly-clustered sample may be counter-productive. 
Policy-makers unfamiliar with the logic of sampling may be far less convinced 
of the representativeness of a sample of even 2,400 interviews if that sample was 
clustered into 200 primary sampling units located within just 20 districts, 
compared to one dispersed across PSU’s in 600 different districts across the 
width and breadth of the country (but which would mean far higher fieldwork 
costs). 
 
It is true that few, if any single surveys in the developing world are anywhere as 




51). But a more appropriate comparison should take into consideration the fact 
that the most important projects in the democratizing world are multi-country, 
and multi-wave, and have no institutional base of predictable financial support 
like the U.S. National Science Foundation. Thus, while the cost considerations 
of any single factor mentioned above or below might be sustainable in a one-off, 
single country study, they become extremely important considerations when 
scholars want to generate donor support for a dozen or so such surveys and 
repeat the exercise in two or three years time. 
 
Thus, comparative survey research in the democratizing world is unlikely to 
meet the ‘gold standard’ of international survey research, if by that we mean full 
probability based samples with no substitution (Heath, Fisher, & Smith, 2005, p. 
319). However, there are reasonable alternative methodologies which, if strictly 
enforced and monitored, might constitute a ‘silver standard’ of research in 
developing contexts. Reliable population lists of census enumerator areas can be 
stratified into socially and politically relevant sub-lists, along provincial, 
regional, or urban and rural lines, enabling researchers to draw a scientific, 
representative area probability sample with probability proportionate to size. 
Within the primary sampling unit, researchers can devise systematic, random 
methods of start points and walk patterns of household and respondent selection, 
with rules for household substitution that are strictly enforced by field 
supervisors to ensure that fieldworkers have no discretion over whom to 
interview. All household visits need to be rigorously documented to enable the 
calculation of contact, refusal and response rates. Fieldwork should also be done 
at times when respondents are most likely to be available and when fieldworkers 
are able to make multiple callbacks, minimizing the need for household 
substitution. The image of a ‘silver standard’ might imply to some a ‘second-
best method’ yielding necessarily inferior, biased data. But this is ultimately an 
open question that needs to be tested through systematic comparison of results 





Low levels of formal education pose special challenges for questionnaire design. 
Innumeracy and/or a lack of familiarity with linear logic means that the numeric 
                                           
3 Heath et al. (2005, p. 328) conclude: ‘We consider it a priority…for methodologists to 
establish empirically whether findings from random-route samples, for example, show 




scales widely used in the West (like feeling thermometers running from 0 to 
100) are often inappropriate. And attempting to convey the idea of a linear or 
symmetric response scale visually through show cards is often not an option 
because of high rates of illiteracy. In response, local investigators have 
developed some ingenious responses such as building a wire anchored on two 
ends and asking respondents to slide a bead back and forth along the wire to 
indicate where their opinions lie between the two designated endpoints. In other 
places, researchers have laid out mats with cards representing differing groups 
and then asked respondents to pick or rank liked and disliked groups, both in 
overall terms or in paired comparisons (Miles & Rochefort, 1991). 
 
Many scholars who design questionnaires for use in developing societies also 
worry that typical Likert scales induce an acquiescence bias, especially where 
people have newly formed, or weakly held attitudes toward subjects such as 
democracy. Not only do such measures overestimate the apparent support for 
democracy or agreement with items measuring democratic values, they may also 
overestimate the validity and reliability of scales based on several such items. 
Scholars usually respond by reversing the valence of several scale items to keep 
respondents alert and avoid response set. Yet reversing item valence may serve 
only to confuse respondents by removing their ability to anchor their responses 
against some fixed referent (see Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999). Thus, 
it is often necessary to resort to ordinal items that force respondents to choose 
from a balanced or unbalanced set of statements. 
 
A final challenge to questionnaire design in the democratizing world comes 
from social heterogeneity. Linguistic diversity not only drives up survey costs 
through the necessity of translating questionnaires into several local languages, 
but also raises serious issues of validity and reliability. Investigators need to 
ensure both that respondents understand a concept like ‘trust,’ ‘tolerance’ or the 
‘rule of law’ in the intended way, but also that respondents across different 
language groups and countries understand it in the same way. This is usually 
accomplished through the process of ‘double-blind’ translation, which adds 
significant costs in terms of both time and finances (but see Heath et al., 2005, p. 
320, who recount several doubts as to what the double blind method actually 
accomplishes). But perhaps the best way to accomplish this is by writing short, 





The Purpose Of Opinion Surveys In The 
Democratizing World 
 
Another factor that distinguishes social scientific surveys in new democracies 
from standard large scale academic surveys in the West is their political 
purpose. Put simply, surveys of transitional societies are not purely social 
scientific instruments. While surveys like the American National Election Study 
or General Social Survey may produce conclusions that ultimately have 
important policy consequences, they are organized and funded primarily as 
scientific vehicles. But while political scientists and sociologists might initiate 
public opinion surveys in transitional societies as vehicles for scientific inquiry, 
the vast majority of cross-national research is supported by international 
foundations and bilateral aid agencies precisely because of their potential 
political and developmental impacts. 
 
First, these surveys inform the larger process of institutional reform by offering 
a feedback mechanism to decision makers. Second, they enhance political 
accountability by letting everyone else know what the government knows.4 The 
first function can be accomplished by communicating results directly to 
government officials in personal briefings and written reports. Yet survey 
researchers working in the developing world often express surprise at how little 
interest most government officials express in their data. Part of this is a product 
of official inexperience with the necessity of learning about voter opinions. Yet 
a major part of this also has to do with the innumeracy and/or skepticism toward 
survey research discussed above. 
 
The second function can be achieved through the dissemination of results 
directly to key political actors like legislators and opposition party officials, but 
also more widely to the public in general through the news media. Elected 
officials can be persuaded to take more interest in survey results if they know 
that their political opponents have the same information, information that might 
be politically embarrassing or damaging. Yet in many places in the developing 
world, innumeracy means that the news media are surprisingly hesitant to 
engage with survey results. And where newspapers and television commonly 
join to commission and report surveys, such as Latin America, media 
organizations are not independent from the government or from specific political 
                                           
4 Bilateral aid agencies also support these surveys because they simultaneously provide a 




parties. On other occasions, the media report uncritically the results of pre-
cooked, partisan surveys as if they were fact (Seligson, 2005, p. 54). In both 
cases, the image of survey research may be undermined rather than 
strengthened. 
 
Survey researchers in transitional societies are also political actors because 
public opinion data can constitute real political threats to the leaders of the often 
hybrid regimes that comprise the ‘new democracies’. Survey results may 
threaten the claims of elected leaders to be the sole, authentic representative of 
their societies and challenge their attempts to overload the meaning of their 
electoral ‘mandate.’ But while survey researchers may locate receptive allies in 
smaller civil society organizations devoted to policy research and democracy 
advocacy, they find no automatic alliance with civil society in general. As 
Ginsberg (1986) has pointed out, survey research transforms our very concept of 
public opinion from a behavioral assertion and a property of interest groups who 
control the timing, framing and method of expression, to an attitudinal response 
that is constrained by researchers’ decision about when to conduct surveys, 
which questions to ask, and how to frame and word questions and responses. 
Thus, survey research may pose a threat to the political power of mass 
organizations like trade unions, citizen movements, policy advocacy groups or 
political parties, groups that are often already suspicious of surveys because of 
ideology or innumeracy. 
 
Finally, the international financial support that underpins public opinion 
research in the democratizing world can be a double-edged sword. While it 
provides the resources that otherwise could not be found in the typical 
transitional society, foreign sponsorship may undercut the legitimacy of a survey 
and limit its local political impact. In rarer occasions, funders may even decline 
to release results that could be seen to show anti-democratic actors or processes 
in a favorable light and damage the local democratization process. In one 
innovative response, Indian survey researchers have created ‘notional local 
funders,’ who provide small amounts of financial support but then publicise, use 






The Content Of Public Opinion Surveys In 
Democratizing Countries 
 
Finally, the larger social, economic and political context of transition has 
profound implications for the content of public opinion surveys in democratizing 
societies. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dominant paradigm of the 
relevance of public attitudes to democracy (based on Almond & Verba’s, 1963, 
classic ‘The Civic Culture’) assumed that democratic stability was predicated on 
the existence of a series of deeply held cultural values such as pragmatism, 
moderation, efficacy, tolerance, and a high degree of interpersonal trust balanced 
with a healthy skepticism of political leaders. A more recent variant has focused 
on a syndrome of ‘self-expression’ values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2006). Rose, 
Mishler and Haerpfer (1998, p. 84) have described surveys based in this 
paradigm as ‘destination studies’ because they measure ‘how near or far 
countries are to a Western-style ideal’ and whether they are becoming ‘just like 
us’ or ‘enough like us.’ 
 
But with the spread of cross national opinion research in the democratizing 
world, a second, quite different approach to surveying transitional societies 
emerged. Based on Linz and Stepan’s (1996) argument that democracy can only 
be consolidated once it has been ‘legitimated,’ that is seen by all significant 
political actors and an overwhelming majority of citizens as ‘the only game in 
town,’ it assumes that in new democracies, whether or not citizens hold norms, 
values or personality traits conducive to democracy is much less important than 
whether they see democracy as better than and prefer it to alternative political 
regimes. Rose et al. (1998) call this the ‘Churchill Hypothesis’ stemming from 
Winston Churchill’s famous dictum that ‘Democracy is the worst form of 
government, except for all the others that have been tried from time to time.’ 
Questionnaires anchored in this approach tap not how close societies are toward 
an ideal, Western set of norms and values, but the direction in which they are 
going and why; Rose et al. (1998, p. 85) call this type of survey a 
‘transformation model.’ 
 
The transformation model informs the measurement strategy of the various 
Global Barometer surveys in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe 
(see Uno, 2005). While accepting that norms and values are undoubtedly 
important, they ultimately prefer to devote scarce questionnaire space to 
measuring how citizens of democratizing societies experience change, how they 




alternatives, and how they evaluate the performance of their new, reforming 
regimes and institutions compared to the old. 
 
To be sure, both traditions are based on the legitimation theory of democratic 
consolidation: that is, regardless of how well-designed a country’s political 
institutions and processes, a sustainable democracy requires people who are 
willing to support, defend and sustain democratic practices. At the same time, 
the transformation model questionnaire offers the additional advantage that the 
data it produces is simultaneously suitable to test institutional explanations of 
consolidation. Institutional theories argue that democratic citizens are the result 
of rather than the necessary condition for effectively functioning democratic 
institutions (e.g. DiPalma, 1990; Norris, 2004). In this case, the resulting data 
can be used to test the effectiveness of new political institutions as well as the 
extent to which institutions actually do (re)shape public attitudes towards 
democracy and politics. The results of value-based surveys, in contrast, can not 
provide such a test because values—according to the theory’s proponents—are 
deeply held and only evolve slowly, over generations rather than within a few 
years in response to specific institutional reforms. Thus, the discipline is well 
served by the existence of both the World Values Survey which measures broad 
change across an impressive range of societies at five to seven year intervals, 
and the Global Barometers which tap more immediate changes in regime 
preferences and institutional evaluations on a more regular basis. 
 
In addition to measuring the extent of public support for democracy, researchers 
studying democratizing societies face the challenge of ascertaining precisely 
what citizens of new democracies understand democracy to be. This usually 
requires open-ended questions to get at least at surface understandings (see 
Bratton & Mattes, 2000; Chu, Diamond, & Shin, 2001; Lagos, 2001), or 
specially designed closed-ended probes that ask whether specific procedures or 
substantive outcomes are essential to democracy (McIntosh, McIver, & Abele, 
1994; Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). 
 
An equally important issue for new democracies is how much people know 
about democracy and politics. Besides asking people to recall or recognize 
specific information about institutions, policies or incumbents, political 
knowledge can be effectively assessed by attaching to questions such as ‘How 
well or badly would you say the government is combating HIV/AIDS’ a filter 
which adds ‘or haven’t you had a chance to find out about this yet’ (Bishop, 
Odendick, & Turfbacher, 1983). Because people who really don’t have an 




increases the level of ‘don’t know’ response. However, while such filters 
provide civil society, the news media, policy makers and donors with crucial 
details about the contours and limits of public engagement, they also present 
data analysts with thorny question of whether to treat ‘don’t know’ responses as 
missing data or as meaningful responses that should be re-assigned to a 





While Western political scientists and sociologists have exported the tool of 
public opinion research to new settings, the different economic, social and 
political contexts of those settings often mean that social scientific surveys of 
public opinion are designed, executed, and received in very different ways than 
in the West. But rather than simply seeing these differences as blemishes that 
need to be gradually ameliorated, we may have much more to learn from the 
globalization of public opinion research than the simple accumulation of more 
data from exotic settings. As Heath et al. (2005) have recently observed: ‘Rather 
than a simple export of Western methods, assumptions and intellectual 
frameworks to non-Western societies, public opinion research might benefit 
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